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Abstract                
In the present essay we begin with a short presentation of the Aetolian proto-
federation, an ancient Greek federation and then, through an interactive approach we 
compare its structure and institutions with those of the European Union (EU), a 
would-be federation and Pakistan, an established federal state in central Asia since 
1948. To achieve this, we make use of a specific set of criteria such as the democratic 
legitimization (or not) of their main federal bodies, the existence or not of common 
defense and security policy, common currency, incentives to participate in the federal 
structure such as single citizenship (Greek: isopoliteia,) and federal justice. Our 
results indicate that the Aetolian federation had practiced a series of institutional 
settlements, such as both direct and representative democracy, cohesion policies such 
                                                 
*
 A first version of this essay was presented at the 53
rd
 ERSA Congress, Regional Integration: Europe, 
the Mediterranean and the World Economy, 27-31 August 2013 in Palermo, Italy and at the Conference 
organised by the Faculty of Economics, University of Thessaly and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 
Volos, 29 April, 2014.   
2 
 
as flexible federal taxation policies and basic economic freedoms and thus, it can 
serve as a benchmark for further EU integration. 
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1. Introduction 
Federalism tends to be understood as a phenomenon of the modern world, 
since federal states seem to be able to address better complex issues such as economic 
advantages arising out of monetary, economic and in some cases, fiscal unions, while 
preserving the cultural identity of population groups and bringing decision making on 
some issues closer to the citizens’ concerns.      
 Currently, more than 25 states globally have a federal type of political 
structure, among them states with great geographic and population magnitude such as 
the US, Canada, Russia, India, Pakistan, Germany, Switzerland, Argentina, Australia 
etc. It is widely recognised that federations have their origins in Greek antiquity 
(Mackil, 2013, p. 1; Economou, Kyriazis and Metaxas, 2014).  
What we will show at first, is that ancient Greek “proto-federations” were the 
first political entities that exercised the federal organization. Approximately 18 cases 
of ancient Greek federations are attested (Larsen, 1968; Mackil, 2013) of which the 
Boeotian, the Aetolian and the Achaean were the most well-known examples and 
(probably) the most advanced and well-organised. In this essay, we choose to analyse 
the Aetolian federation, where safer results, based on ancient sources (see Polybius, 
Histories and Livy, History of Rome) and modern literature can be traced. 
What is new in our essay, is the comparative presentation of the Aetolian 
proto-federation with two modern cases, the European Union, and Pakistan and the 
evaluation we propose using a specific set of criteria: the existence or not of a 
democratic legitimization of the main federal bodies, common defence and security 
policy, common coinage, incentives to participate in the federal structures, such as 
single citizenship (Greek: isopoliteia, meaning the transfer of the political rights, of a 
citizen of a state, when he moves to another within the federation), civic and property 
rights (Greek: enkteseis) or the level of the federal budget as a mechanism of 
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implementing social welfare policies to the federal constituents.    
 We consider such an analysis not as an anachronism, since we don’t argue that 
a federation that dates back in antiquity can be comparable with a modern state of 
today in all of its structures and ways of organization. What we wish to achieve 
through this analysis, through a subtractive approach, is to contribute to the 
international scholarship by finding out what lessons (if any) for our modern societies 
can be traced by the analysis of the organization and institutions of the first ever 
recorded functional federal political entities that can be found in the Greek antiquity.
  Some could argue that even the two modern cases we compare here, the EU 
and Pakistan have many differences between each other. The EU is not even a 
federation yet. However, in this analysis we consider the EU as a federal entity “under 
construction” since it appears that after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the former 
European Economic Community (EEC) evolved towards a “European Union”, 
otherwise, an entity which will be further integrated in political, economic and 
judicial issues towards the “United States of Europe” as a visionary, one of its 
founding fathers, Jean Monnet wished to be achieved in the long-term future. Thus, in 
this paper we see the EU as a “potential” federation. In our interactive analysis, we 
compare the Aetolian federation to the EU and Pakistan, under a very specific set of 
criteria, so that we can avoid any problems of either anachronism or problems that 
have to do with inefficiencies in comparison because of the different institutional 
structure of the three case studies.
1
  
Our paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we offer a brief historical 
analysis of the Aetolian federation, in section 3 we proceed with an analysis 
concerning its political and economic organization. In section 4 we present a 
comparative analysis among the Aetolian federation, EU and Pakistan. Finally, in 
section 5 we offer our comments and suggestions. 
 
2. The Aetolian federation’s history in brief 
The Aetolian federation was established during the first half of the 4
th
 century, 
with its primary purpose being defense mainly against Macedon of Philip II who 
                                                 
1
 We do acknowledge that such an analysis we perform here must be very cautious. The same does 
apply not only to any comparison between Pakistan and the EU, but in any other federal case 
comparison, such as India and the EU.  
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reigned during 359-336 BC (Larsen, 1952; Grainger, 1999). However, Mackil, (2013, 
p. 9) argues that the Aetolian federation existed as early as, the early 5
th
 century BCE, 
since ancient sources (Polyb. 2.41.7-8; Thuc. Hist. 3.102.5) and an epigraphic 
evidence found in the ancient state of Sparta, being codified as T(48), mention a 
recorder alliance between the Federation of the Aetolians and the ancient city-state of 
Sparta. 
The Aetolian Federation expanded during the 3
rd
 century to include more than 
40 city-states in Central and Southern Greece, such as Corinth, an important trade 
center (Rahtjen, 1965; Larsen, 1972; Mackil, 2013).During the 3
rd
 century BCE the 
Aetolian federation was one of the major military and geopolitical powers in ancient 
Greece competing with other major entities such as Thebes, Macedonia, the Aetolian 
Federation, Sparta, the Hellenistic kingdoms of Alexander the Great’s generals in Asia 
Minor and Rome which was gradually rising as a geopolitical power at that era. In 
279 BCE the federation verified its influence and strength by repelling a strong Gaul 
invasion near Delphi, the famous ancient sanctuary.
2
      
 Finally, the Aetolians were engaged in the war between the Hellenistic 
kingdom of Seleucids under Antiochus the 3
rd
 and the Romans. When Antiochus was 
defeated in mainland Greece in 192 BCE
3
, gradually the Aetolian federal state was 
subjugated and after the defeat of the neighbouring Achaean federation by the 
Romans, Aetolia finally became a roman province.  
 
3. The main political and economic institutions of the Aetolian federation 
The two main political institutions of the federation were the popular federal 
Assembly of citizens, where every citizen from each city-state that comprised the 
federation could participate in each of the gatherings of citizens and had the right to 
vote on a variety of issues.         
 At least two gatherings a year were taking place, one in the capital of the 
federation Thermos, which was the “centre” of the administration offices, the place 
where the assembly was taking place and the place which was used to host ritual 
festivals, as a sanctuary. This first pan-Aetolian gathering of all citizens throughout 
                                                 
2
 It was an environment, strongly characterized by the harsh competition between those states 
struggling for power, what H. Morgenthau (1963, 1965) would have called a “power politics” 
environment. See among others, Fine (1940) and Grainger (1999).  
3
 See Bringmann, K. (2007). A history of the Roman republic. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 91. 
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the federal state called Thermika, was held in autumn. The other main meeting of the 
assembly was taking place in one of the other cities-states of the federation. This 
second gathering, which was called Panetolika was taking place sometime during 
spring (Mitsos, 1947; Larsen, 1952; Mackil, 2013).      
 The second main political body was the federation’s Council, where the issues 
to be discussed in the Assembly were settled (by the Councilors). Members of the 
federal Council were elected in their city-states by their compatriots by local city-state 
assemblies (see Livy Hist. 35. 34. 2-4; 36. 28. 8.). This means that, their election and 
the formation of the Council was taking place through an indirect democracy 
procedure.  
Concerning the government of the federation, the highest official from this 
government group was called strategos, literally meaning the general, who was both 
the supreme military commander, who combined also the office of “head of state”, to 
use a modern terminology. Under him, served a 10-member Council of high-ranking 
officials called apokletoi, who were being elected through either during the workings 
of the first pan-Aetolian assembly, the Thermika, or through the workings of both the 
annual assemblies. This council was comprised by the cavalry commander (Greek: 
hipparch), the admiral, (Greek: navarchos)
4, the “public secretary” and the “finance 
minister” called (in Greek) tamias (de Laix, 1973; Mackil, 2013). 
So, by this short description it is evident that the Aetolian federation used a 
functional mixed political system with elements of both direct (the Assembly of 
citizens) and indirect democracy (the Council). Furthermore, the elected members of 
the government body could be anyone from every city-state throughout the federation. 
Thus they had a democratic legitimization in the eyes of their constituents.  
The Aetolian state was organized on separate provincial levels, where both 
regional political and economic magistrates ran provincial policies, whereas the 
existence of a common federal army, common currency and federal budget to run 
state expenses were seen to be of major importance. To run the economy of the state, 
the Aetolian federation was based mainly on the crucial role of the seven economic 
administrators called tamiai. Each of the seven tamiai was responsible for supervising 
                                                 
4
 As we notice in the hierarchy, they were some high-ranking officials with double responsibilities. 
Their responsibilities combined both general state and military. We guess that their military duties were 
practically exercised only when the federation was engaged in war campaigns. To achieve their dual 
duties they would probably have been aided by other officials, lower in the state hierarchy. 
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and implementing economic policy in each of the seven provinces of the federation. 
Thus, except for the political head of every province of the federation (like today’s 
Governor of the federal 50 states in the USA) called voularhos, there were seven 
economic administrators and seven military commanders (called hepilektarchoi), each 
one of them responsible for the security in his region (Rzepka, 1999; Scholten, 2000).  
Actually, there was a “chief” federal tamias (one of the seven members) that could be 
more or less equated to a modern finance minister.      
 In coordination with the council of the other six tamiai, they were responsible 
for the economic management of each of the seven regions and the federation as a 
whole, whereas they also acted as the keepers of the federal treasury and served as 
monetary officials for the federal coinage as well as implementing public policy such 
as funding military expenditure (mainly paying the federal army, see Rzepka, 1999). 
 The Aetolian federation had utilized actually a parallel circulation of both 
federal and local coins being minted in both local and federal mints in city-states (De 
Laix, 1973, pp. 65-75; Mackil, 2013, pp. 251-254). This means that the federation was 
a monetary union, (resembling to some extend to today’s eurozone). Although there is 
no specific information on banking in the federation we can speculate that the 
federation was using banks as banking activities were widespread in the Greek world 
from the mid-fifth century (Cohen, 1997). 
In addition, we know from a series of inscriptions, such as the codified T(39) 
being found in the city-state of Arcadian Orchomenos, that the federation had 
established the right of citizens of one member city-state to own property in another 
member city-state, called enkteseis. Schwahn (1931) and Mackil (2013, p. 257, 261-
262) argue that a clearly defined system of property and civic rights was in force and 
was a major prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the ancient Greek federal states 
as a whole, both democratic or not. This ability to buy land and other type of property 
everywhere in the federation or to move and stay in another city-state, by having also 
civic and political rights (to vote and being voted as a magistrate) an institutional 
practice called as isopoliteia, was a crucial element for the federation’s success.  
 In order to make more clear what “vote and being voted” through isopoliteia 
meant, we offer to this point a paradigm of how isopoliteia would function if it was 
valid in the EU. For example, a French citizen who establishes himself in Spain does 
not automatically acquire the right to vote in the Spanish national elections, eg., for 
the Spanish prime minister or for the Spanish parliament elections.  
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As Mackil (2013, pp. 327-328) points out, these federal institutional 
settlements were very prodigal in boosting religious and economic interaction, 
pooling of resources, promotion of regional mobility and trade transactions. All these 
mechanisms were feasible to be achieved since the Aetolian federation was utilising 
federal common coins which were making the commercial transactions easier and 
faster. These coins, made of silver or copper, had an intrinsic value and the 
transactions were safe since there were federal economic supervisors in the market 
called agoranomoi, who i) were responsible for protecting the market against 
extortionate prices ii) adjusting disputes between the buyers and the sellers iii) 
protecting both buyers and sellers by inspecting the validity of the coins themselves in 
order to avoid any case of counterfeit (ibid, p. 266). Moreover, concerning judicial 
services, the Aetolian federation was utilizing both local and federal courts. (Polybius 
2.37. 10.11; Ager, 1996).  
From the overall analysis in this section, we can reach some important 
conclusions: First of all, that the Aetolian federation was utilizing an efficient system 
of both direct and representative democracy. Direct democracy is important for 
modern societies since i) citizens participating more actively in crucial matters which 
determine their future ii) the principal-agent problem between the voter and the 
parliamentary elected magistrate is faced in a more efficient way iii) econometric 
studies such as those of Voigt and Blume (2006) have shown that through direct 
democracy procedures, the public administration functions more properly and 
efficiently. 
Second, through single citizenship (the free mobility of both capital and 
labour) as well as, the protection of civic, property and political rights, the economy 
functioned more properly and city-states willingly decided, through a bottom-up 
strategy, to participate in the federation (see also Mackil, 2013, p. 325). We argue, 
that a “dynamic culture of federal values and conscience”, was gradually emerging 
through the functioning of the Aetolian federal institutions, creating strong bonds 
between federal citizens.         
     
4. The comparison between the three cases 
Table 1 presents a general overview of a series of institutional settlements of 
the Aetolian federation in comparison to the EU and Pakistan, which we consider to 
be of major importance in order for a political entity to be characterized as a 
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federation.           
 It shows that the Greek proto-federation had established an institutional 
framework of values and principles (such as political democratic structures, a regime 
of equal political rights, common foreign policy, common currency and common 
federal justice). Furthermore, all three cases present democratic political structures, 
safeguarding political rights and justice. As we have already analysed in section 3, the 
Aetolian federation had established a harmonious and functional system of both direct 
and indirect democracy,   
By contrast, in the EU, although the member-states practice representative 
democracies with some elements of direct democracy as far as national referendums 
are concerned, still the EU lacks in democratic procedures concerning the EU 
institutional bodies. Neither the European Commission members, nor the European 
President are being elected but appointed. Only the European parliament members are 
elected, but unfortunately, they still have limited capabilities, mainly of consultive 
character to the commission or approving the scanty EU annual budget (just 1% of the 
EU GDP as a whole).          
 The fact that an EU magistrate is appointed instead of being elected, perhaps 
by universal vote by the citizens throughout the EU, is an indication that democracy is 
still lacking in the EU. In short the EU institutional bodies, except the EU parliament 
have no democratic legitimization by the EU citizens. Thus, the EU can be seen as 
less democratic than the Aetolian federation. 
As far as democratic procedures in Pakistan are concerned, according to the 
Pakistani Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (2012 Report)
5
 
“after the 9th General Election in Pakistan (which took place in Feb 2008) democracy  
strengthened gradually. However “still more attempts should be undertaken to 
improve democratic procedures in the centre and the provinces”…“systemic 
improvement will not change unless more and more people join and reform them, nor 
change in more and better representatives will be seen unless public fields and 
supports better electoral candidates and rigorously engage and oversea their 
performance” (p.9).  
 
                                                 
5
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/SDR/AssessmentoftheQualityofDemocracyinPakistan_
Year2012.pdf. 
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Table 1: A comparative analysis of the institutional framework of the Aetolian federation in relation to 
Canada and the EU.  
State 
Member 
states/prov
inces 
Capital 
Main institutional organs intended for 
taking political decision and executive 
power 
Regime of 
equal 
political 
rights 
(isopoliteia) 
Common 
Foreign and 
Defence 
Policy 
Local and 
federal 
coins 
Federal justice 
Aetolian 
Federation 
? Thermos 
Local Assemblies + Federal Assembly 
(Thermika and Panaetolika) 
 
Federal Council and Apoklitoi  
 
Strategos (General)   
 
(Hipparch , Public Secreraty,  7 Τamiai] 
 
7 Regional governors (boularchs)  
7 regional economic managers (tamiai) 
7 military commanders (hepilektarchs) 
▼ 
 
▼ 
 
 ▼ 
 
 
 
EU 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
Brussels 
European Parliament 
 
Council of Ministers  
 
European Summit (heads of state and  
governments) 
 
European Commission 
 
 
 
- 
 
Weak CFSP 
 
EU 
Battlegroups 
 
 
▼ 
(ECB) 
 
 
 
 
▼ 
Court of Justice 
of the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Islamabad 
 
Islamic Federal and Parliamentary 
Republic 
 
Government – Prime Minister 
 
Parliament (Senate and National 
Assembly of elected members) 
 
A federal capital territory and 4 main 
provinces 
 
Regional and local organization of 
governance: 
[149 districts (zillahs), 558 sub-districts 
(tehsils) and several thousand union 
councils] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▼ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▼ 
Pakistan 
Armed Forces  
 
Musallah 
Afwaj-e-
Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▼ 
 
The 
Pakistani 
rupee 
 
 
 
 
 
▼ 
Supreme Court 
of Pakistan 
 
 Federal 
Shariat Court  
 
Five High 
Courts 
Explanations: 
▼ : institution in force  
* 
: Pakistani provinces maybe considered as 7, by including the Federal capital territory and two autonomous and disputed 
territories, Gilgit–Baltistan and Azad Kashmir 
Source: Interactive analysis based on the findings of Mitsos (1947), Larsen (1952), Granger (1999), 
Scholten (2000), Mackil (2013) and Economou, Kyriazis and Metaxas (2014) for the Aetolian 
federation, Moussis (2008) and Peterson and Shackleton (2012) for the EU, and Khan (2005) and Shaq 
(2014) for Pakistan. 
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Since 1947, the total number of days under democratic governance in 
Pakistani politics are 8781, while 8503 days of governance are related with military 
rule.
6
 This is crucial, since it seems that both democratic governance and military rule 
seem to share approximately the same amount of time in Pakistani politics. However, 
Pakistan had established an innovative democratic constitution in 1973 formed by 
elected representatives. It was a parliamentary type of democracy in which the 
executive power was concentrated in the office of the prime minister. The parliament 
consisted of two houses, the national assembly and the senate. The Constitution also 
provided the institutional responsibilities of the four provincial governments and the 
distribution of legislative power between the federation and the provinces 
(http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-constitution/p15657#p6).   
 Having the above in mind, it appears that the Pakistani policymakers need to 
coordinate their attempts for achieving a more efficient and functional democratic 
regime.
7
 However, what is very encouraging for Pakistan, is that since April 2010, it 
adopted comprehensive reforms which restored many of the provisions of the 
Constitutions of 1973. It limited the powers of the president and restored power to the 
provinces. According again to the Pakistani Institute of Legislative Development and 
Transparency 2014 Report
8
, 71% of the Pakistani people consider holding Local 
Government elections nationwide in contrast to the 27% who think that these 
elections are not very important or not important at all.  
Moreover, 65% of Pakistanis believe that elected Local Governments are very 
                                                 
6
 http://www.dawn.com/news/1132128. 
7
 Based on archival materials, internal military documents, and interviews with politicians, civil 
servants, and Pakistani officers, Aqil Shah (2014) argues that, “democracy failed exceptionally quickly 
after independence because Pakistan possessed a weak and fragmented political party that was unable 
to resolve key governing conflicts”. Pakistan's democratic system has fluctuated between civilian and 
military governments at various times throughout its political history, mainly due to political instability, 
civil-military conflicts, political corruption, and the periodic coup d'états by the military establishment 
against weak civilian governments, resulting in the enforcement of martial law across the country 
(occurring in 1958, 1977 and 1999, and the last led by General Pervez Musharraf). Shaq adds that since 
Pakistan gained independence in 1947, it has been ruled by its military for over three decades. Even 
when they were not directly in control of the government, the armed forces maintained a firm grip on 
national politics.  
8
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/Publication/SDR/PublicOpinionOnQualityofDemocracyInPakistan
_June2013ToMay2013.pdf. 
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important in solving the problems faced by Pakistani Citizens, in contrast to 32% of 
Pakistanis who asserted that elected Local Governments are not important in resolving 
the problems faced by citizens. According to our view these majorities of the 
Pakistani people, who are in favour of democratic procedures are very positive signs 
that in Pakistan a dynamic emerging democratic conscience is gradually developed. 
As far as the other criteria are concerned, except Pakistan, which has one 
federal currency, the Pakistani rupee, the other two cases possess a “mixed” system of 
usage of both local and federal coins. When it comes to the EU, the euro, which is 
under the aegis of the European Union Central Bank (ECB) cannot be considered yet 
a “federal currency”. It is in usage only by the 19 Eurozone member-states. In the 
issue of single citizenship both the Aetolian federation and Pakistan, as true 
federations utilize single citizenship. However, single citizenship is not the case in the 
EU, at least yet. Citizens in the EU still don’t have the right to move out from one 
member state to another, say citizens from the UK who move to Letonia, they can stay 
there but they don’t have political rights to vote and being voted in national elections 
whenever they are to take place.
9
 
Furthermore, concerning the issue of federal courts and justice, it appears that 
our three cases have managed to utilize an efficient system of justice. The Aetolian 
federation had both local and federal courts (Ager, 1996). Pakistani Judicial system is 
comprised by an hierarchical system: First of all the higher level of judiciary, the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan, the Federal Shariat Court and the Five High Courts, with 
(4 High Courts, each for one province and a High Court for the Islamabad Capital 
Territory). The lower level of judiciary consists of civil and criminal district courts, 
and numerous specialised courts covering banking, insurance, customs and excise, 
smuggling, drugs, terrorism, taxation, the environment, consumer protection, and 
corruption (see Yasin and Banuri, 2004).  
Finally, the Aetolian federation and Pakistan may be regarded as superior to 
the EU as far as foreign policy and defence issues are concerned, going further than 
today’s EU with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the “tools” of 
achieving this, the Eurocorps and the EU Battlegroups.  
                                                 
9
 However, citizens in the EU have the right to acquire property in another member state. They also 
have civic rights when being there for a period (these two privileges called enkteseis as we said in the 
Aetolian federation), and they can participate in electoral procedures, but only those related to local 
elections.   
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 Except for these basic criteria, to this point, we are going to mention in brief 
another aspect which seems to us crucial for a federal entity to continue to function 
properly. A basic element for a federation is to have a legitimacy in the in the eyes of 
its constituents. Federal policymakers must act in concert to their constituent’s wishes. 
As Mackil (2013, p. 330) argues, a functional federation needs to have a bottom-up 
legitimization by its constituents. In other words, federal citizens must willingly wish 
to “defend the system” according to Weingast (1997). 
The Aetolian federation had a monetary union (federal coins), a type of fiscal 
union, through single citizenship and regional mobility of both capital and labour 
being combined by an effective system of protection of both property rights. 
According to Mackil, (2013, ch. 5) and Economou, Kyriazis and Metaxas (2014) it 
had introduced also a big annual budget intended mainly for common defense, 
although extant ancient sources do not allow us to give exact numbers. Turning back 
to our modern cases, Pakistan had for the 2014-2015 period total federal expenditures 
as high as 3.937 Rs (39.3 billion of dollars). Federal Pakistani GDP for 2014 is at 
about $237 billion. Thus we can deduce that Pakistani federal budget for 2014 was 
approximately 16.5% of the annual GDP, which is a considerable sum but certainly 
much higher than the €124 billion for the EU budget in 2014, which is analogous to 
only 1% of the EU GDP as a whole.
10
   
 And not only that, but also that the EU policymakers have introduced during 
the last years harsh taxation/austerity policies. The perception of citizens of 
constituent EU states that they are being imposed with harmful regulation by distant 
non-elected bureaucrats or politicians undermines the prestige and legitimacy of the 
EU. This again seems to be happening in many European member-states, especially, 
but not only, those where the so-called “memoranda” have been introduced after 
2010. (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus). In these countries many citizens have the 
impression that the EU/EMU is responsible for the imposition of unnecessary harsh 
austerity measures, about which they had no say, that decreased their individual 
incomes and prosperity.
11
   
                                                 
10
 For all these statistical data we offer here, see 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:fRB2Sl5AF2YJ:www.dawn.com/news/111032
4+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; http://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan 
http://europa.eu/pol/financ/index_en.htm . 
11
 The IMF itself, as well as the other members of the so called “troika” (IMF, European Commission 
13 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The idea of a voluntary participation in a federal political entity as a means of 
promoting prosperity in each national member, is analyzed by Musgrave (1961, 
1988), Pauly (1973, 1998), and Oates (1998), known as economic federalism and it 
seems that this theory can explain the motives of the creation of the EU in 1992 and 
its gradual expansion as for example, that of 2004, where 10 new members from 
eastern Europe voluntarily decided to become members of the EU, thus acting 
similarly to what the Greek Aetolian region city-states decided to do 2400 years ago, 
by forming a federation.   
However, if the EU wishes to evolve into a real and functional federal state, it 
needs to have its main institutional mechanisms such as the EU Commission and the 
President of the EU elected by universal vote by the EU constituents as a whole. The 
EU should also establish a more efficient and bigger “federal” budget for introducing 
compensatory social policies in favour of its citizens and perhaps, to abandon 
austerity measures as a means of implementing economic policy, because under them 
its cohesion is diminished and its prestige is gradually being eroded. 
 Pakistan needs to further strengthen its democratic cohesion. To achieve this it 
might also be beneficial if sometime in the near future, Pakistani policymakers should 
attempt to introduce bottom-up referendums for every aspect of social life, with a 
binding character and nature or enact citizens’ initiatives12, meaning proposals by a 
group of citizens to be introduced by the government. Pakistan may also need to 
increase its federal budgetary programming in favour of social compensatory 
measures, that, we think, will increase democracy’s prestige in the eyes of Pakistani 
citizens. These measures we propose here come out as a modern interpretation of the 
institutional arrangements that the ancient Aetolian people had introduced: to share 
                                                                                                                                            
and European Central Bank) has accepted that it terribly mis-estimated the so called fiscal (negative) 
multiplier for the austerity package for Greece. They estimated it as being at about -1, while ex-post it 
was nearer -2, which led to a much deeper recession and unemployment than estimated. Since the 
beginning of the depression in 2008, Greece’s GDP has been reduced by 25% and unemployment has 
reached almost 28% by the end of 2013. 
12
 A version of initiatives have already been introduced in the EU, and more commonly in the US and 
Switzerland. In the EU, according to the Nice Treaty, a European referendum (but not binding) can be 
held after gathering of 1 million of citizen’s signatures.  
14 
 
their fruits of collaboration by improving their standards of living.   
 We hope that this paper will contribute to the international dialogue for 
making our societies more prosperous and efficient by making our modern 
democracies working more properly, “flexibly” and cleverly.  
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